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Abstract 
The field of neuroaesthetics has gained in popularity in recent years but also attracted 
criticism from the perspectives both of the humanities and the sciences. In an effort to 
consolidate research in the field, we characterize neuroaesthetics as the cognitive 
neuroscience of aesthetic experience, drawing on long traditions of research in 
empirical aesthetics, on the one hand, and cognitive neuroscience on the other. We 
clarify the aims and scope of the field, identifying relationships between 
neuroscientific investigations of aesthetics, beauty and art. The approach we advocate 
takes as its object of study a wide spectrum of aesthetic experiences, resulting from 
interactions between individuals, sensory stimuli and context. Drawing on its parent 
fields, a cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics would investigate the complex cognitive 
processes and functional networks of brain regions involved in those experiences, 
without placing a value on them. Thus, the cognitive scientific approach may develop 
in a way that is mutually complementary to approaches in the humanities. 
Keywords: aesthetics, empirical aesthetics, cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience, 
neuroaesthetics 
 
  
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       3 
Neuroaesthetics: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience 
 
 
“In all products of human industry we notice the keenness with which the eye is attracted to the mere 
appearance of things: great sacrifices of time and labour are made to it in the most vulgar 
manufactures (...) There must therefore be in our nature a very radical and wide-spread tendency to 
observe beauty, and to value it. No account of the principles of the mind can be at all adequate that 
passes over so conspicuous a faculty” (Santayana, 1896, p. 4). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Humans, as Santayana (1896) observed, are drawn to the aesthetic features of objects 
and the environment around them. Such features are not mere inconsequential 
adornments; they influence people’s affective responses, decisions, and behavior. For 
instance, aesthetics plays a central role in consumers’ choice of products (e.g. 
Reimann, Zaichkowsky, Neuhaus, Bender, & Weber, 2010; Van der Laan, De Ridder, 
Viergever, & Smeets, 2012), in judgments of built environments (e.g. Kirk, Skov, 
Christensen, & Nygaard, 2009; Vartanian et al., 2013), natural environments,	  (e.g. 
Balling & Falk, 1982; Kaplan, 1987), and in forming attitudes, judging, and behaving 
towards other people (e.g. Kampe, Frith, Dolan, & Frith, 2001; Leder, Tinio, Fuchs, 
& Bohrn, 2010; Mende-Siedlecki, Said, & Todorov, 2012). By virtue of what neural 
processes do aesthetic features influence people’s attitudes, decisions and behaviour? 
More generally, what are the neural underpinnings of aesthetic appreciation? These 
are some of the questions neuroaesthetics aims to answer. 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       4 
Neuroaesthetics is a relatively recent field of research whose general goal is to 
understand the neural substrates of human aesthetic appreciation. Neuroaesthetics can 
properly be viewed as a subfield of cognitive neuroscience, given that it studies a 
form of human cognition and behavior using a combination of techniques and 
methods from neuroscience and cognitive science, bringing together the cognitive and 
neural levels of explanation (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1988; Gazzaniga, 1984). 
Research in empirical aesthetics has a long history, originating with Fechner’s (1876) 
pioneering use of psychophysics to study aesthetic appreciation. In a general sense, 
psychophysics deals with the relation between stimulation and sensation, specifically 
with the scaling of sensory magnitude. This, however, is the object of outer 
psychophysics, which Fechner regarded mainly as an indirect approximation to a 
more fundamental relation. The crucial aim of psychophysics, in Fechner’s (1860) 
view, was to explain the relation between sensation and neural activity, and this was 
the object of inner psychophysics (Boring, 1950; Scheerer, 1987). Fechner (1860) was 
unable to study this relation experimentally because the appropriate technology and 
methods had still not been developed. Nevertheless, he elaborated the conceptual 
foundations of inner psychophysics, characterizing the neural concomitants of 
sensation and memory in terms of oscillatory processes in broadly distributed neural 
networks (Fechner, 1882/1987).  
A true experimental study of the neural substrates of aesthetics—what Fechner 
might have conceived as the experimental inner psychophysics of aesthetics—has 
emerged only in the last decade or so. Nevertheless, the field of neuroaesthetics is 
finding its feet (Chatterjee, 2011), and developing the proper formal and institutional 
mechanisms that characterize any scientific domain, as demonstrated by the 
convening, in 2009, of the field's first international conference (Nadal & Pearce, 
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2011), the publication of a Research Topic on brain and art in the journal Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience (Segev, Martínez, & Zatorre, 2014), a special issue of the 
journal Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity and the Arts (Nadal & Skov, 2013), and 
several books on the neural foundations of aesthetic experience (Chatterjee, 2014a; 
Shimamura & Palmer, 2012; Skov & Vartanian, 2009; Zaidel, 2005). 
 With articles reporting experimental research on the cognitive neuroscience 
of aesthetic preference, valuation, and experience, now numbering in the hundreds, 
neuroaesthetics has reached a stage where it is useful to consider what it has 
accomplished, and where it should go in the future. A number of papers have 
reviewed the recent literature (Chatterjee, 2011; Chatterjee & Vartanian, 2014; Cross 
& Ticini, 2011; Leder, 2013; Nadal, 2013; Skov, 2010; Zaidel, 2010) and reported 
meta-analyses (Brown et al., 2011; Vartanian & Skov, 2014). These efforts have 
integrated and made sense of the results of brain lesion and neuroimaging studies on 
the appreciation of painting, sculpture, music, and dance. Moreover, they have 
galvanized and consolidated research, while also increasing awareness of the field, 
which, perhaps inevitably, has generated controversies amongst a wider audience.  
Thus, rather than adding another review of neuroaesthetics research to the 
aforementioned list, we aim in this paper to outline a much needed conceptual 
framework for the field. In doing so we will also attempt to address some 
controversies regarding the nature of neuroaesthetics, its aims and scope, and what it 
can contribute to science and the humanities. 
There are at least two reasons why addressing such questions is important in a 
broader sense. First, as neuroaesthetics has begun to draw attention, it has aroused 
criticism from several quarters, including humanistic researchers who believe it is 
either irrelevant or misguided as a scientific enterprise. Similar criticisms have 
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previously been leveled at other subdisciplines of cognitive neuroscience that intrude 
on topics traditionally addressed using non-biological approaches, including 
economics, philosophy, and sociology. It is important not only to show why these 
arguments, when cast in general terms, are misleading or unjustified, but also to 
clarify how understanding neural mechanisms can tell us something important and 
novel about aesthetic experience. Second, while it probably appears obvious to most 
neuroscientists that studying the neural correlates of consciousness, economics, or 
social behavior is important for understanding cognition and the brain, it is perhaps 
not readily apparent what is gained by studying the neural substrates of aesthetic 
experience or the production of artworks. Hence, it is also important to highlight the 
distinctive features of aesthetic experience that make it an object of interest for 
neuroscientists.  
 
Aims and Scope 
 
Neuroaesthetics has become an interdisciplinary field of study in that it 
represents research at the intersection of different fields, and by scientists with varied 
interests, priorities, and paradigmatic backgrounds (Chatterjee, 2011; Nadal & Pearce, 
2011). Nevertheless, we believe there is sufficient empirical evidence and conceptual 
development to begin delineating a consensus on its aims and scope.  
A comprehensive understanding of aesthetics requires explanations at several 
levels of analysis. Based on Aristotle’s four causes, Killeen (2001) argued that 
complex forms of cognition and behavior call for efficient, material, formal, and final 
explanations. Briefly, in this context, efficient causes of a behavior refer to its 
external triggers. Material causes include the anatomy and physiology underlying the 
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behavior. Formal causes refer to the system of relations reflected in formal models of 
the behavior (e.g. Leder et al., 2004). Final causes refer to the aims and goals of the 
behavior (i.e., what is its function?). We might also refer in this context to Marr’s 
(1982) distinction between the implementational, algorithmic/representational and 
computational levels of explanation in neuroscience. Neuroscientific explanations 
primarily address material causes (at the implementational level), but also in varying 
degrees the other causes (Nadal & Skov, 2013). It is important to note that although 
understanding the material cause of behavior is necessary, it is not sufficient for 
understanding the complete picture for aesthetic or artistic behavior. Consequently, 
neuroaesthetics must draw on research in philosophical aesthetics, art theory, 
neurological aesthetics, psychological aesthetics and evolutionary aesthetics amongst 
others (Zaidel, 2005, 2010) to address the other causal explanations and levels of 
representation. 
What is the object of study of neuroaesthetics? Neuroaesthetics is sometimes 
characterized as a quest for universal rules relating objective properties of artworks to 
activation in specialized brain regions that underlie the perception of beauty (Conway 
& Rehding, 2013; Di Dio & Gallese, 2009). On the one hand, this approach relates 
neuroaesthetics specifically to art (Conway & Rehding, 2013; Cross & Ticini, 2011; 
Di Dio & Gallese, 2009; Nalbantian, 2008), leaving non-artistic objects out of scope. 
On the other hand, it unjustifiably reduces the experience of art merely to its aesthetic 
features, or even more specifically, to beauty (Brown & Dissanayake, 2009; Seeley, 
2011). We argue that an interdisciplinary conceptualization of neuroaesthetics 
warrants adopting a broader view, one that is in line with both humanist and scientific 
approaches. As a philosophical discipline, aesthetics deals with the conceptual and 
theoretical aspects of both art and aesthetic experience. This dual focus recognizes 
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that art and aesthetics overlap conceptually and historically, but they are not identical:  
“the connection between art and aesthetics is a matter of historical contingency, and 
not part of the essence of art” (Danto, 1997, p. 25). In keeping with this philosophical 
and historical tradition, we can address the perceived conflation of art and aesthetics 
in neuroaesthetics (Brown & Dissanayake, 2009; Seeley, 2011) by proposing a 
distinction between two different, but overlapping, sub-fields: the cognitive 
neuroscience of aesthetics, and the cognitive neuroscience of art (see Fig. 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Relationships between the Cognitive Neurosciences of art, aesthetics 
and beauty. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetics investigates the 
neurocognitive underpinnings of aesthetic experiences in response to many sorts of 
objects, not just artworks. Aesthetic experiences can relate to beauty, but are not 
limited to do so. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Art, in turn, investigates the 
neurocognitive underpinnings of the appreciation and creation of art, which can be 
approached from many different angles in addition to aesthetics. Both fields intersect 
when investigating the aesthetic appreciation of artworks. See text for further details. 
 
 
In this sense, the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics is a scientific quest to 
understand the neurocognitive and evolutionary underpinnings of the aesthetic 
experience of a broad range of objects, including, amongst others, appliances and 
other commonplace objects (Bar & Neta, 2006; Izuma & Adophs, 2013), graphic and 
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industrial design (Reimann et al., 2010), mathematical concepts and proofs 
(Chatterjee, 2014a cf. Hardy, 1940; Zeki, Romaya, Benincasa, & Atiyah, 2014), 
natural visual scenes (Tinio & Leder, 2009), faces (Aharon et al., 2001; Chatterjee, 
Thomas, Smith, & Aguirre, 2009; Winston, O’Doherty, Kilner, Perrett, & Dolan, 
2007), scents, and tastes (Plassmann, O'Doherty, Shiv, & Rangel, 2008; Schifferstein, 
2010) in addition to artworks (Cela-Conde et al., 2009; Lacey et al., 2011; Vartanian 
& Goel, 2004). The emphasis here is on the aesthetic experience of these objects, 
understood as “emergent states, arising from interactions between sensory–motor, 
emotion–valuation, and meaning–knowledge neural systems” (Chatterjee & 
Vartanian, 2014, p. 371) (see next section). Thus, for example, we would consider 
studies of pitch representation in the perception of musical structure (e.g. Shepard, 
1982), outside the domain of the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics, because they do 
not relate directly to issues of valuation and meaning. However, studies of the 
relationships between psychological pitch representations and processing and 
perceptual pleasure (e.g. Egermann, Pearce, Wiggins, & McAdams, 2013; Huron, 
2006) would fall under the umbrella of the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics. 
The cognitive neuroscience of art1, on the other hand, aims to understand the 
neurocognitive and evolutionary mechanisms by which humans are able to engage 
with art at many different levels, in addition to the purely aesthetic level (Seeley, 
2011; Zaidel, 2005, 2010). These include reflecting about art’s self-referential 
aspects, understanding an artwork’s personal or social meaning, the relation between 
medium, style, and content, grasping its significance in art-historical or art-critical 
contexts, and so on. In this sense, “Aesthetic emotions are unquestionably an integral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We use the term art to refer to the full range of visual and performing arts including 
painting, printmaking, sculpture, photography, music, dance, literature, drama, 
architecture and so on. 
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part of the arts, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient to characterize them. 
Thus, a narrow focus on aesthetic responses is ultimately a distraction from the larger 
picture of what the arts are about” (Brown & Dissanayake, 2009, p. 54).  
As we have defined them, both sub-fields overlap when studying the 
neurocognitive foundations of the aesthetic appreciation of artworks. Often, the focus 
of neuroaesthetics has been biased towards understanding the neural correlates of the 
appreciation of beauty in art. However, as conceived here, and illustrated in Fig. 1, 
this subset should not be equated with the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics—or of 
art, for that matter—and it need not be its central focus. In fact, while beauty can play 
a role in the appreciation of art—which some scholars have suggested is biologically 
based (Zaidel, 2010)—diverse psychological states (e.g., pleasure, emotions such as 
wonder, awe and the sublime but also revulsion, hatred, and the grotesque) can also 
play a significant role (Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004; Leder & Nadal, 
2014; Silvia, 2009; Silvia & Brown, 2007). Therefore, we should be wary of falling 
foul of the fallacy of composition by assuming that understanding beauty is the only, 
or even the most important, goal of the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics. 
Intentionally or not, much of the work that falls under the umbrella concept of 
neuroaesthetics has been carried out at the intersection between aesthetics and art. 
Consequently, most of what we, Seeley (2011) and Brown and Dissanayake (2009) 
conceptualize as the cognitive neuroscience of art, remains to be developed, as has 
also been pointed out by others (Gopnik, 2012; Minissale, 2012). Although research 
on aesthetic responses to art only addresses one part of the larger puzzle, the bias 
towards using artworks as a resource for research in the cognitive neuroscience of 
aesthetics has several advantages. First, the arts often come with a long and detailed 
tradition of analysis (e.g., musicology, art theory, literary theory and criticism), which 
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can offer valuable insights into aesthetic experience. Second, artworks constitute a 
primary source of aesthetic experience for many people, to the extent that some 
scholars have placed aesthetic experience at the core of art’s definition (Anderson, 
2000; Beardsley, 1983). 
 
Conceptual Foundations 
 
 If the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics investigates the cognitive and 
neural processes involved in aesthetic experience, the field must (i) clarify what is 
meant by aesthetic experience, (ii) develop a conceptual understanding of how it 
might be related to the brain, and (iii) identify the sources that contribute to the 
experience. We examine these issues in this section. 
One of the main conceptual stumbling blocks for the cognitive neuroscience of 
aesthetics—and one of the major sources for criticism of neuroaesthetics—has been 
characterizing aesthetic experience, its very object of study. This might seem 
alarming and unprecedented, but it is not uncommon in the history of science. At one 
stage, biology had to grapple with the question of what life is, and physics with the 
question of what matter is. In their foundational book on computational neuroscience, 
Churchland and Sejnowski (1992) faced the similar problem of defining what 
computation is—a fundamental concept in this nascent field. They believed that 
precise definitions “become more convincing, meaningful, and interconnected as the 
empirical discipline matures and gives more ballast to the theory. (...) It is not, 
however, that one must say nothing—in that event, one could not get the science 
started. The point rather is that the theory outlining the elementary ideas of the 
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discipline gradually bootstraps itself up, using empirical discoveries as support, and 
kicking away old misconceptions in the haul” (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992, p. 61). 
 A precise characterization of aesthetic experience requires that we 
acknowledge the cultural and historical constitution of this concept. Current 
conceptions of aesthetics and aesthetic experience owe much to the thinking of 18th 
century European philosophers such as Shaftesbury (1711/1999) and Kant 
(1790/1892). This was a period in which art became separated from other spheres of 
human experience; a move that was accompanied by the peeling of aesthetic interests 
away from general-purpose and everyday pleasures. Disinterested contemplation 
came to be considered as the appropriate way of engaging with art: “To assure the 
autonomy of art from everything else, aesthetic experience is defined as something 
utterly apart from every conceivable purpose” (Carroll, 2008, p. 152). In contrast, in 
non-Western societies, aesthetics generally encompasses a broader range of activities 
and objects than Western aesthetics, and it is more closely related to the 
communication of spiritual, ethical and philosophical meaning than in the Western 
tradition (Anderson, 1989). For instance, for the Huichol people of Mexico, beauty is 
a measure of the extent to which something incarnates the character of the deity it is 
meant to represent. Thus, Huichol aesthetics and ethics are inextricably bound 
together: “Aesthetics is not concerned with passive reflection, but with an active 
attitude to maintain or adjust a system of ethics, inherited from their ancestral deities, 
which organizes the world and defines appropriate activities and relations with it” 
(Shelton, 1992, p. 241).  
Aesthetic experience also varies throughout time and between historical 
periods. The history of Western art alone is replete with examples of artworks that 
were popular in their day, but whose reputation has since withered into obscurity. On 
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the other hand, there exist many examples of artworks which have caused outrage at 
their unveiling by their audacious departure from convention, but have since become 
much admired staples of the repertoire (e.g., Beethoven’s ninth Symphony, 
Stravinsky’s Le Sacre du Printemps, or the Impressionist style in visual arts), as 
cultural conventions have shifted or expanded to accept these transformatively 
creative works.  
If the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics aims to characterize the biological 
and cognitive substrates of aesthetic experience, then a strict focus on an 18th Century 
Western conception of aesthetic experience, understood as a dispassionate, 
purposeless and decontextualized engagement, is likely to be inadequate. As Carroll 
(2008) argued, “the standard characterization of aesthetic experience is effectively 
useless from the point of view of empirical research” (Carroll, 2008, p. 158). A 
cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics must be able to account for varieties of such 
experience across cultures and historical periods.  
A broader and less historically and culturally biased notion of aesthetic 
experience can be found in Shusterman’s work (Shusterman, 1997; Tomlin, 2008). He 
defined three crucial features in aesthetic experience: An aesthetic experience has an 
evaluative dimension, in the sense that it involves the valuation of an object; it has a 
phenomenological or affective dimension, in that it is subjectively felt and savored, 
drawing our attention; and, finally, it has a semantic dimension, in that an aesthetic 
experience is a meaningful experience, not mere sensation. One aspect that seems to 
distinguish the affective component of aesthetics is that the associated emotional 
states lack the motivational drive to act that is common in other rewarding affective 
states (Chatterjee, 2014b; Scherer, 2004). Chatterjee (2014b) has suggested that the 
emotions involved in aesthetic experience might be related to a reward system of 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       14 
liking or pleasure (subserved by opioid and cannabinoid neurochemical systems) 
rather than a reward system related to wanting to satisfy desires (subserved by 
dopaminergic neurochemical systems) (Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009). In 
this way it might be possible to be disinterested and emotionally invested at the same 
time.2 
From this perspective, the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics aims to 
understand the biological and cognitive mechanisms that enable humans to have 
perceptual experiences which are evaluative and affectively absorbing (though 
possibly not satisfying particular motivational desires), in individually and culturally 
meaningful ways. Conceiving aesthetic experience in this manner has the virtue of 
connecting with the philosophical tradition and the study of art and aesthetics in non-
Western societies (Anderson, 2004). Moreover, it converges with Chatterjee and 
Vartanian’s (2014) notion of the aesthetic triad derived from their review of research 
in neuroaesthetics. They argue that, when examined together, brain lesion and 
neuroimaging evidence suggests that aesthetic experiences arise from the interaction 
among neural networks involved in sensory-motor, emotion-valuation, and meaning-
knowledge processing.  
This brings us to the second issue: how aesthetic experiences relate to brain 
activity. Some commentators have characterized the goal of neuroaesthetics research 
as finding a “beauty center” in the brain (Conway & Rehding, 2013). However, the 
vast majority of theoretical and empirical research in neuroaesthetics points to a range 
of cognitive processes and several brain networks being involved in aesthetic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It should be noted that while this is consistent with the general idea of disinterested 
interest understood, in a broad sense, as a pleasure without incentive or inclination, it 
does not necessarily correspond to Shaftesbury or Kant’s notions of disinterested 
interest, given the clear differences in terms of the specific conceptual understanding 
of art, aesthetics and mind within which those philosophers expressed their ideas.   
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experience (Chatterjee, 2014a; Leder et al., 2004; Nadal, 2013; Nadal & Pearce, 
2011). Indeed, cognitive models of aesthetic experience typically stress the 
involvement of basic perceptual processes, memory, attention, emotion, social 
cognition and other cognitive processes each with a corresponding substrate of brain 
regions and networks  (e.g. Brattico & Pearce, 2013; Leder, 2013). Moreover, using 
the methods of cognitive neuroscience to understand these cognitive processes in 
terms of brain function is not to discount the importance of subjective experience. It is 
simply one more tool (although an especially powerful one if used skillfully) to go 
alongside phenomenology, experimental psychology, computational modeling and 
other methodological approaches to understanding the mind, each with its own 
strengths and limitations. 
Finally, we consider the characterization of neuroaesthetics (and other 
branches of aesthetics) as a search for rules connecting objective properties of 
artifacts (including artworks) with aesthetic experiences (Conway & Rehding, 2013). 
In line with other areas of psychology and cognitive neuroscience (e.g., emotion: 
Scherer & Zentner, 2001; memory: Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, & Nadel, 2007), 
aesthetic experiences surely arise from a complex interplay of factors related to the 
object, the individual, and the context (Jacobsen, 2006). Research on frisson 
experienced during musical listening, for example, often entails listeners self-
selecting music that gives them chills and using other listeners’ selections for the 
control condition (Blood & Zatorre, 2001; Salimpoor, Benovoy, Larcher, Dagher, & 
Zatorre, 2011; Salimpoor & Zatorre, 2013). This moves the focus firmly onto the 
listener’s individual musical experience and away from objective properties of the 
music. Other research has shown that semantic and physical contexts influence the 
subjective experience and neural processes in response to works of art (Brieber, 
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Nadal, & Leder, 2015; Brieber, Nadal, Leder, & Rosenberg, 2014; Kirk, Skov, 
Hulme, Christensen, & Zeki, 2009; Lengger, Fischmeister, Leder, & Bauer, 2007). 
While it is important to understand the role of object properties, a focus on the object 
itself can have several negative consequences, not least that it encourages cherry-
picking a few choice artworks that happen to corroborate the theory (Hyman, 2010), 
ignoring the many that fail to do so, which in turn hampers the goal of putting 
together a coherent research programme with testable hypotheses (Chatterjee, 2011).  
Neuroaesthetics has sometimes been criticized precisely for treating the object 
and the person out of their context: “Paintings are treated as mere isolated stimuli or 
sets of stimuli (...) The works and our experiences of them are divorced from their 
cultural context, and from the viewer’s individual history” (Tallis, 2008, p. 20). This 
might have been more true in 2008 than it is today. Serious research is being 
performed outside the laboratory, avoiding the separation between object, experience, 
and context noted by Tallis (2008). For instance, the neural correlates of dance 
appreciation are being studied using live performances and on-line measures (Jola, 
Abedian-Amiri, Kuppuswamy, Pollick, & Grosbras, 2012; Jola & Grosbras, 2013; 
Stevens et al., 2009), the physiological concomitants of the aesthetic appreciation of 
paintings have been examined in actual museum visitors (Brieber et al., 2015; Brieber 
et al., 2014; Tschacher et al., 2012) and physiological affective responses to music 
have been studied in audiences at live concerts (e.g., Egermann et al., 2013). 
 
 
What can Cognitive Neuroscience Add to our Understanding of Aesthetics? 
 
Criticisms of scientific aesthetics from the humanities 
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 Dickie (1962) claimed that psychology had little to contribute to aesthetics, 
both in terms of understanding aesthetic experience, and in terms of clarifying 
concepts and methods in the study of aesthetics. Although not all philosophers share 
this extreme position (Beardsley, 1966), neuroaesthetics has continued to be criticized 
from the humanities because of its failure to produce interesting results about art 
itself. Some even go as far as claiming that neuroaesthetics is, in principle, unable to 
contribute to knowledge about art (Massey, 2009; Tallis, 2008). There are at least 
three cogent responses to these criticisms, which demonstrate that cognitive 
neuroscience can and does contribute to our understanding of aesthetics (which we 
have argued above is not limited to art).  
First, taken at face value, these criticisms seem to imply that the brain is not 
involved in the production or appreciation of art, so that any understanding of the 
neural basis of these abilities is irrelevant. Second, they seem to deny that any 
scientific approaches to aesthetics could contribute to aspects of art those critics are 
specifically interested in, or to the sorts of issues they are concerned with, including 
the concept of the aesthetic, the definition of art, the ontology of art, determining what 
makes a good artwork, and so on (Levinson, 2003). It seems, however, unfair to judge 
the merits of the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics based on how much—or how 
little—it contributes to the question of whether artworks are good or bad (Tallis, 
2008). The cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics is concerned with people’s behavior, 
cognition, and experience in relation to aesthetics. Its aim is not necessarily to provide 
answers to philosophical questions about art, nor to replace philosophical aesthetics. 
Third, the relevance of cognitive neuroscience to aesthetics and art should be 
clear because art and aesthetics are often defined in cognitive terms. Notice how 
often such terms appear, for example, in Beardsley’s (1969) definition, “A person is 
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having an aesthetic experience during a particular stretch of time if and only if the 
greater part of his mental activity during that time is united and made pleasurable by 
being tied to the form and qualities of a sensuously presented or imaginatively 
intended object on which his primary attention is concentrated” (Beardsley, 1969, p. 
5, emphasis added). Levinson’s (1996) more recent conception of aesthetic pleasure 
also relies on psychological processes: “Pleasure in an object is aesthetic when it 
derives from apprehension and reflection on the object’s individual character and 
content, both for itself and in relation to the structural base on which it rests” 
(Levinson, 1996, p. 6, emphasis added). Cognitive neuroscience has much to 
contribute regarding pleasure, sensation, imagination, attention, apprehension, and 
reflection, and the processes by which they interact (see, for instance Vessel, Starr, & 
Rubin, 2012). Thus, the cognitive neuroscience of art and aesthetics can help to 
unravel the psychological and neural processes involved in phenomena that were 
formulated in philosophical conceptions of art and aesthetics. 
 
Science and the humanities as complementary approaches to aesthetics 
The concern has been expressed that in attempting to create general predictive 
models of aesthetic experience, we lose the quintessential essence of those 
experiences: their unique, privileged and individual quality (Tallis, 2008). It is 
important to acknowledge a genuine tension here between an approach often taken in 
the humanities in which a given artifact is studied in detail, relating it to the particular 
historical circumstances in which it was created and experienced, and that of the 
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sciences, where the tendency is to pose and corroborate general predictive models of a 
given phenomenon.3  
However, it is important not to confuse a theoretical stance on a phenomenon 
(aesthetics in this case) with a method for studying it. As illustrated above, the 
scientific approach to aesthetics need not imply a focus on objective properties of the 
stimulus (Conway & Rehding, 2013), nor necessarily on generalizing across 
individuals as illustrated by various neuropsychological case studies of artists 
(Chatterjee, Bromberger, Smith II, Sternschein, & Widick, 2011; van Buren, 
Bromberger, Potts, Miller, & Chatterjee, 2013; Zaidel, 2005). Furthermore, the 
scientific approach need not entail a sharp distinction between phenomena that are 
aesthetic and those that are not (Conway & Rehding, 2013). Aesthetics is likely to 
resemble other complex phenomena in psychology and neuroscience, such as autism 
(where a spectrum of conditions result from a complex interaction between genetic 
and environmental factors) (Persico & Bourgeron, 2006), or color perception (where 
the relationship between frequency and perceived color categories varies as a complex 
function of context as well as individual and cultural experience (Roberson & Hanley, 
2007; Zeki & Marini, 1998). Therefore, we posit a spectrum of different aesthetic 
experiences depending on the individual (their experience, stable traits and current 
motivational and emotional state), the context, and the object. 
These considerations mean that scientific and humanistic approaches can share 
the same theoretical stance while taking different methodological approaches to 
studying the phenomenon, each with potentially complementary strengths and 
weaknesses. The enlightenment philosopher John Locke (1690/1997) portrayed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Following the principle of Ockham’s razor, scientists seek simple theories with 
general coverage but a theory must, first and foremost, account for the phenomena 
and there may be aspects of individual aesthetic experiences that are genuinely unique 
and require individual treatment. 
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philosophy as a kind of servant to science, clarifying concepts and assumptions and 
interpreting results. We suggest that rather than playing a subordinate role, 
philosophical and scientific approaches can fruitfully complement each other, 
operating hand-in-hand. Examples of such complementarity are not hard to come by, 
even in the fields of art and aesthetics. For instance, Darwin (1871/1998) is usually 
credited with the original observation that aesthetic features and the affective 
responses they elicit play a crucial role in mate choice. However, Joseph Addison 
(1712) and Thomas Reid (1785) had already stressed this adaptive role of natural 
beauty: “There seem likewise to be varieties in the sense of beauty in the individuals 
of the same species, by which they are directed in the choice of a mate, and in the 
love and care of their offspring” (Reid, 1785, p. 744). Thus, Darwin’s (1871/1998) 
great accomplishment was to propose a natural mechanism—sexual selection—that 
explained observations made by earlier British empiricist philosophers. In this sense, 
the scientific evolutionary approach to aesthetics is not opposed to the philosophical 
approach, but a natural extension of it. 
Moreover, and contrary to some recent suggestions of territorial squabbles 
between scientists and humanists (Hutton & Kelly, 2013), recent research in the 
cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics is essentially interdisciplinary. In fact, projects 
bringing together philosophers, architects, art historians, psychologists, 
neuroscientists, and physicists (Brieber et al., 2014; Brinkmann, Commare, Leder, & 
Rosenberg, 2014; Cela-Conde et al., 2013; Huang, Bridge, Kemp, & Parker, 2011; 
Kozbelt & Seeley, 2007; Oshin Vartanian et al., 2013) have demonstrated just how 
much there is to be gained from a closer partnership between C. P. Snow’s ‘two 
cultures’ (Snow, 1964);.  
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What can the Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetics Contribute to the 
Understanding of Human Cognition? 
 
 The cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics has also been viewed on occasion 
with suspicion, or mere indifference, from within scientific disciplines. First, some 
view art and aesthetics as limited to museum exhibitions, concert halls, and other 
sophisticated leisure activities, rather than as a fundamental feature of the behavioral, 
cognitive, and neural constitution of Homo sapiens (e.g., only humans produce art 
spontaneously). Second, others are wary of the subjectivity involved in the 
appreciation of art and aesthetic experience. Third, one might question why we need a 
biological theory of aesthetics in addition to a psychological one. In this section, we 
briefly address these three issues, remembering first that we argued above for a 
conceptual distinction between the aesthetics and art (and the subfields of cognitive 
neuroscience investigating these phenomena). 
 
Pervasiveness of Aesthetic Cognition  
 Regarding the first concern expressed above, art and aesthetics are not 
restricted to few exclusive occasions, contexts, and social classes; they are ubiquitous 
manifestations of human neurocognitive capacities. The vast majority of humans, to a 
lesser or greater degree, engage routinely in some form of art, understood in a broad 
sense: 
  
“We are accustomed to understand art to be only what we hear and see in 
theatres, concerts, and exhibitions; together with buildings, statues, poems, 
novels ... But all this is but the smallest part of the art by which we communicate 
with each other in life. All human life is filled with works of art of every kind 
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from cradle-song, jest, mimicry, the ornamentation of houses, dress and utensils, 
up to church services, buildings, monuments, and triumphal processions. It is all 
artistic activity” (Tolstoy, 1904, p. 51). 
 
 Thus, understood in this broader sense, aesthetics is intrinsic to some of the 
activities people hold most dear to them. In fact, as argued by Dissanayake (1988, 
2009), art is a vital component in such activities, contributing to heighten the 
uniqueness and specialness of the object, activity, or occasion. Artistic and aesthetic 
production and appreciation are an integral part of natural human behavior 
(Lorblanchet, 2007). As such, knowledge about their cognitive and neural 
underpinnings is of interest to cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. As 
expressed by Arnheim, “Art, as any other activity of the mind, is subject to 
psychology, accessible to understanding, and needed for any comprehensive survey of 
mental functioning” (Arnheim, 1966, p. 2).  
 
Subjectivity of Aesthetic Experience 
 The second concern expressed by scientists regarding the cognitive 
neuroscience of aesthetics is not very different from the one originally directed at the 
study of consciousness. It refers to its personal and subjective nature: science cannot 
deal with the eminent subjectivity of aesthetic experience and its individual 
uniqueness. This critique is not new, for even the early proponents of scientific 
aesthetics had to deal with it (Munro, 1928), and can be understood in three different 
but related ways. 
In one sense, the subjectivity criticism expresses the concern that aesthetic 
experience cannot be measured independently from the experiencing subject: It is a 
subjective state that is not directly linked to a concrete property of an object in the 
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world, and therefore lies outside the scope of science. This argument, however, is 
only an apprehensive rehashing of one of the early realizations of cognitive 
psychology. Just as memory is not a faithful store of events that can be played back, 
perception is not a photographic recording of objects’ properties; it is an active 
process of constructing a meaningful representation of the world which is sensitive to 
transient contextual features and personal goals and intentions. Thus, “Whether 
beautiful or ugly or just conveniently at hand, the world of experience is produced by 
the man who experiences it” (Neisser, 1967, p. 3). However, this has not prevented 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience from developing a multitude of methods to 
measure implicit processes in subjective experiences, from which the cognitive 
neuroscience of aesthetics has profited greatly. For instance, Chatterjee and 
colleagues (2009) were able to show that even when participants did not explicitly 
attend to the attractiveness of a series of faces they were viewing, and were not 
required to provide any sort of explicit attractiveness assessment, the ventral occipital 
cortex was still responsive to this facial feature. 
In a second sense, the subjectivity criticism seems to suggest that there is no 
way aesthetic experience can be studied scientifically because subjective states vary 
from moment to moment and from person to person. An aesthetic experience is like a 
snowflake: On the whole, it is similar to any other; in the details it is unique, 
ephemeral and unrepeatable. No two aesthetic experiences are the same. Thus, how 
can something as elusive as an aesthetic experience be pinned down with general 
principles? Additionally, this elusiveness makes definition difficult, and this is one of 
Conway and Rehding’s (2013) main critiques of neuroaesthetics: “the lack of a 
cogent, universally accepted definition of beauty” (Conway & Rehding, 2013, p. 4).4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Note also our argument above that beauty is not synonymous with aesthetics.  
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It might seem that the lack of a universally accepted definition of the aesthetic 
experience should warrant skepticism towards scientific aesthetics and its 
achievements. But what about other branches of psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience that also deal with elusive phenomena and lack broadly shared 
definitions of key concepts? Take emotions, for instance. People differ greatly as to 
what it means to experience happiness, what it is like be in love, or to feel rejected, 
and as to the degree to which different objects and situations elicit different kinds of 
emotions. This, however, does not preclude scientists from studying emotion. It only 
means that scientific research on emotion—and on aesthetic experience—must 
determine the factors that explain the differences between individuals, and differences 
within individuals at different moments and in different circumstances. In fact, several 
studies have shown that these differences can be accounted for and, moreover, that 
they can be used to model brain activity related to aesthetic experience (Chatterjee et 
al., 2009; Vartanian, Lam, Fisher, Granic, & Goel, 2013). But not only are emotions, 
like aesthetic experiences, phenomenologically elusive; they also defy clear, precise, 
and widely-agreed definitions: “‘emotion’ has no generally accepted definition” 
(Izard, 2010, p. 369). Thus, even 130 years after William James (1884) asked What is 
an emotion?, there is substantial disagreement among emotion researchers regarding 
such important issues as the function of emotions, the specificity of the physiology of 
emotion, the difference between emotion and mood, or the role of cognitive processes 
in emotion (Ekman & Davidson, 1994). However, the cognitive neuroscience of 
emotion has managed to develop successfully despite such disagreements. It is 
reasonable to expect the same from the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics.  
Finally, the subjectivity critique might also relate to dissatisfaction with the 
absence, in the domain of aesthetics, of correct and incorrect responses that would 
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allow a standardized measure of aesthetic performance. Such assessments do in fact 
exist (Barron & Welsh, 1952; Child, 1962; Götz, Borisy, Lynn, & Eysenck, 1979; 
Wilson & Chatterjee, 2005), but they provide a relative, rather than absolute, measure 
that compares individual’s performance to that of a reference group. However, it is 
worth remembering that such objective measures are only useful to the extent that 
they capture the important properties of subjective aesthetic experience. 
In summary, the critique of the subjectivity of aesthetic experience is a 
manifestation of what Santayana (1896) called the prejudice against ourselves: the 
devaluation of the product of mental processes in favor of objects and laws that are 
independent of our own nature:  
“We have still to recognize in practice the truth that from these despised feelings of ours 
the great world of perception derives all its value, if not also its existence. Things are 
interesting because we care about them, and important because we need them. Had our 
perceptions no connexion with our pleasures, we would soon close our eyes on this 
world (...) A judgment is not trivial, however, because it rests on human feelings; on the 
contrary, triviality consists in abstraction from human interests” (Santayana, 1898, p. 4-
5). 
 
What is Gained by Understanding Brain Mechanisms? 
Finally, it is pertinent to ask why we need a cognitive neuroscience of 
aesthetics when we have a healthy tradition of psychological research in empirical 
aesthetics. There are at least two reasons, one methodological, the other theoretical, 
which we come to below.  
As a preliminary, we note that scientific psychology, in general, and empirical 
aesthetics, in particular, have always been coupled to the study of the brain. William 
James wrote that “[psychologists] must be ‘cerebralists’, to the extent at least of 
admitting that certain peculiarities in the way of working of their own favorite 
principles are explicable only by the fact that the brain laws are a codeterminant of the 
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result” (James, 1890, p. 4). This is not to say that psychology can be reduced to, or 
abandoned in favor of, neuroscience. Searching for neural mechanisms underlying 
psychological processes “(...) does not make the psychologist a physiologist, for 
precisely the same reason that the physiologist need not become a cytologist or 
biochemist (...) the psychologist is interested in physiology to the extent that it 
contributes to his own task” (Hebb, 1949, p. xv). Reflecting the general case, 
empirical aesthetics has aspired, both in its inception (Fechner, 1876) and in its 
modern reformulation (Berlyne, 1971), to explain the neural foundations of aesthetic 
behavior and cognition. As noted above, Fechner saw the outer psychophysics upon 
which he based empirical aesthetics (Fechner, 1876) as an approximation to charting 
the relation between mental and neural processes, inner psychophysics (Scheerer, 
1987). Berlyne (1971) also firmly believed that psychological explanation was 
incomplete if it lacked biological foundations: “Every form of behavior must depend 
on bodily structures, including characteristics of the human nervous system (…) This 
must hold for aesthetic activities as well as for any others, so that the psychological 
study of art must include a search for the biological origins of art” (Berlyne, 1971, p. 
8, emphasis added). Thus, explaining the relationship between aesthetic experience 
and brain function has always been central to empirical aesthetics. 
What is gained by doing so? First, from a methodological perspective, the 
cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics provides a whole new suite of research tools and 
methods to the armory of the empirical aesthetician. In this sense, the contribution of 
the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics to psychological aesthetics is no different 
from the contribution of the cognitive neuroscience of language to psycholinguistics, 
for instance. Generally speaking, the tools of cognitive neuroscience have helped 
psychologists (i) to understand how cognitive processes are related to underlying 
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neural mechanisms; (ii) to study cognitive or affective processes (or aspects of those 
processes such as their temporal course) that are not accompanied by overt behavioral 
responses; (iii) to determine whether two tasks rely on common or different 
mechanisms; and (iv) to constrain cognitive theories and models (Mather, Cacioppo, 
& Kanwisher, 2013; Poldrack, 2006; White & Poldrack, 2013). Examples of all four 
contributions exist in the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics. Neuroimaging and 
neurophysiological methods have been used to show, for instance, that (i) aesthetic 
experiences are related to activity of large-scale neural networks rather than specific 
regions (Cela-Conde et al., 2013; Vessel et al., 2012); (ii) facial attractiveness is 
processed even when people do not explicitly attend or overtly respond to it 
(Chatterjee et al., 2009) and aesthetic judgments involve two distinct stages: an early 
impression formation and a subsequent evaluative categorization (Cela-Conde et al., 
2013; Jacobsen & Höfel, 2001, 2003); (iii) aesthetic experiences of music and 
painting rely partly on common affective processes (Ishizu & Zeki, 2011). Finally, 
(iv) results from such studies have challenged and complemented cognitive models of 
aesthetic appreciation, and therefore contributed to refine and reformulate them, as 
discussed by Brattico, Bogert, and Jacobsen (2013), Leder (2013) and Leder and 
Nadal (2014). For example, neuroimaging studies showing that beliefs about the 
authenticity or authorship of artworks have an impact on how rewarding they are 
(Kirk et al., 2009), and that this occurs at early processing stages (Huang et al., 2011), 
have prompted a strengthening the role of semantic context in a widely used model of 
the aesthetic experience of art (Leder & Nadal, 2014). 
Second, from a theoretical perspective, neuroaesthetics augments empirical 
aesthetics with the general conceptual framework of cognitive neuroscience. A good 
example is the centuries-long debate on the manner in which aesthetic experience and 
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pleasure are related, discussed above in Conceptual Foundations. Burke (1757) made 
one of the most singular contributions to this debate by arguing that aesthetic feelings, 
such as beauty and the sublime, arise from the same neural processes that cause 
pleasant and unpleasant emotions, such as love and fear. His views later became the 
cornerstone of some of the early psychological approaches to aesthetics (Allen, 1877; 
Marshall, 1894) and persisted during the behaviorist heyday as a factor explaining 
choice (Beebe-Center, 1932). The idea that aesthetic appreciation relies on the neural 
substrates of pleasure and pain even constituted the central theoretical pillar of 
Berlyne’s (1971) new experimental aesthetics, where the hedonic tone of aesthetic 
experiences was proposed to result from the combined activity of brain systems 
related to reward and aversion. 
However, the notion that brain activity related to reward underlies aesthetic 
appreciation remains somewhat toothless without a detailed empirical understanding 
of the reward system itself and how it is involved in human aesthetic experience. And 
this is where the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics has made two of its most 
substantial contributions to experimental aesthetics. First, it has offered a thorough 
description of the brain’s reward system participating in aesthetic appreciation: (i) it 
has pinpointed the brain regions and neurotransmitter systems involved; (ii) it has 
characterized the temporal dynamics of neural activity in these regions and systems 
(e.g. Salimpoor et al., 2013); (iii) it has shown how these systems and dynamics are 
modulated by intrinsic and extrinsic factors (for reviews see Chatterjee & Vartanian, 
2014; Nadal, 2013; Skov, 2010). One of the major insights that emerge is that the 
valuation of art, music, and other cultural objects, such as money, relies on the same 
neural mechanisms that mediate reward derived from food or drink, thus contributing 
to the notion of a “common currency” for choice (Batra et al., 2013; Brown et al., 
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2011; Levy & Glimcher, 2012; Sescousse et al., 2013). Second, the conceptual 
apparatus of cognitive neuroscience permits a fruitful reanalysis of the debate about 
what kinds of pleasure are aesthetic, and what distinguishes aesthetic pleasure from 
other sorts. As noted in the Conceptual Foundations section above, Berridge and 
colleagues’ (2009) distinction between two forms of reward—liking and wanting—
allows the characterization, in principle at least, of aesthetic pleasure as “liking 
without wanting”, as a reward that is unrelated to the satisfaction of desires. 
Additionally, relying on the notion of functional connectivity and advances in its 
estimation, recent studies show that aesthetic pleasure is characterized by the tight 
coupling of activity in reward brain regions and sensory brain regions. 
Let us consider two specific examples. Using a combination of [11C]raclopride 
PET scanning, fMRI and behavioral measures, Salimpoor et al., (2011), found that 
peak musical experiences (pleasurable chills to familiar self-selected musical 
excerpts), were associated with dopaminergic activity in the caudate nucleus while the 
nucleus accumbens was involved in the anticipation of the peak experience. Thus, the 
experience itself and its anticipation appear to be served by dopamine release in 
distinct regions of the striatal system, again underlining the important role of semantic 
context. In a subsequent study, Salimpoor et al. (2013) used a bidding paradigm, in 
which participants were asked to listen to unfamiliar fragments of music and allocate 
amounts of money to listen to them again if they wished. The degree of activity in the 
nucleus accumbens and an increase in functional connectivity between this region and 
the auditory cortex, the amygdala, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, predicted 
the amount of money participants were willing to pay to listen to their preferred 
fragments again.  
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These studies demonstrate that pleasurable musical experiences involve 
dopaminergic activation in distinct areas of the reward system, which is functionally 
connected to sensory processing (see also Lacey et al., 2011). This accounts for 
motivation to repeat or continue the experience of listening to a piece of music but, it 
cannot, in and of itself, explain the pleasure associated with the experience. However, 
striatal dopamine systems are intricately and reciprocally connected with opioid 
systems in the nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum though to underlie pleasure 
(Salimpoor et al., 2015). Understanding in more detail the relationships between these 
systems and the extent to which they can be activated in isolation provides a 
compelling and rigorous empirical pathway towards distinguishing different varieties 
of (aesthetic) pleasure. 
 
Looking Ahead 
 
In response to commentaries on the cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics from 
both the humanities and the sciences, we have argued for a conception of the field that 
applies beyond art to a wider range of sensory phenomena and encompasses a greater 
variety of sensations than beauty. We have encouraged an interdisciplinary approach 
that incorporates biology, neuroscience, psychology, and the socially embedded 
nature of aesthetic experiences, which is wide enough to include differences between 
cultures and over time. We have argued strongly for a sophisticated scientific 
approach in which we investigate a spectrum of aesthetic experiences depending on 
the interaction of the individual and the context as well as properties of the objects 
forming the focus of an aesthetic experience. The goal is to understand the 
psychological and neural processes of an individual having an aesthetic sensory 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       31 
experience in a given context, not to place a value on its object. Aesthetic experiences 
engage a wide range of cognitive processes and networks of brain regions. We believe 
the methods of cognitive neuroscience extend the toolbox of the empirical 
aesthetician in useful ways, rather than replacing traditional experimental and non-
experimental methods. 
 Looking ahead, this vision suggests a multi-disciplinary approach which aims 
to understand aesthetic experience at a number of levels ranging from subjective 
experience, though cognitive processing, systems neuroscience to cellular and genetic 
factors using a range of different methods, each with complementary advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, lab-based studies with artificial stimuli allow great 
experimental control but lack ecological validity, so they should be complemented by 
studies of people in genuinely aesthetic situations (Brieber et al., 2015; Brieber et al., 
2014; Egermann et al., 2013; Jola & Grosbras, 2013; Jola, Pollick, & Grosbras, 2011; 
Stevens et al., 2009; Tschacher et al., 2012) which have high ecological validity but 
may suffer from additional noise. Furthermore, since aesthetic episodes can have 
transformational effects, it will also be important to investigate the consequences of 
aesthetic experience on cognitive, emotional and social function (Wang, Mo, 
Vartanian, Cant, & Cupchik, 2015). We look forward to decades ahead in which the 
cognitive neuroscience of aesthetics, neuroaesthetics, develops into fully productive 
scientific maturity, integrated with its parent disciplines of empirical aesthetics and 
cognitive neuroscience. 
  
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       32 
References 
Addison, J. (1712). On the pleasures of the imagination. The Spectator, 412, Monday, 
June 21. Reprinted in: The Spectator. In six vols. Volume the Fourth. Nº 325-
434. (1813) London: Andrew Wilson. p. 1336-1340.  
Aharon, I., Etcoff, N., Ariely, D., Chabris, C. F., O'Connor, E., & Breiter, H. C. 
(2001). Beautiful faces have variable reward value: fMRI and behavioral 
evidence. Neuron, 32, 537–551.  
Allen, G. (1877). Physiological aesthetics. London: Henry S. King & Co. 
Anderson, J. C. (2000). Aesthetic concepts of art. In N. Carroll (Ed.), Theories of art 
today (pp. 65-92). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press. 
Anderson, R. L. (1989). Art in small-scale societies (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
Anderson, R. L. (2004). Calliope's sisters. A comparative study of philosophies of art 
(2 ed.). Upper Saddle River, JN: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Arnheim, R. (1966). Toward a psychology of art. Berkeley, CA: The University of 
California Press. 
Balling, J. D., & Falk, J. H. (1982). Development of visual preference for natural 
environments. Environment and Behavior, 14, 5-28.  
Bar, M., & Neta, M. (2006). Humans prefer curved visual objects. Psychological 
Science, 17, 645-648.  
Barron, F., & Welsh, G. S. (1952). Artistic perception as a possible factor in 
personality style: Its measurement by a figure preference test. The Journal of 
Psychology, 33, 199-203.  
Bartra, .O., McGuire, J.T., & Kable, J.W. (2013). The valuation system: A 
coordinate-based meta-analysis of BOLD fMRI experiments examining neural 
correlates of subjective value. NeuroImage, 76, 412-427. 
Beardsley, M. C. (1966). Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the present. A short 
history. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press. 
Beardsley, M. C. (1969). Aesthetic experience regained. Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 28, 3-11.  
Beardsley, M. C. (1983). An Aesthetic Definition of Art. In H. Curtler (Ed.), What Is 
Art? (pp. 15-29). Haven: New York University Press. 
Beebe-Center, J. G. (1932). The psychology of pleasantness and unpleasantness. New 
York: D. Van Nostrand Company. 
Berlyne, D. E. (1971). Aesthetics and Psychobiology. New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts. 
Berridge, K. C., Robinson, T. E., & Aldridge, J. W. (2009). Dissecting components of 
reward: 'Liking', 'wanting', and learning. Current Opinion in Pharmacology, 9, 
65-73.  
Blood, A. J., & Zatorre, R. J. (2001). Intensely pleasurable responses to music 
correlate with activity in brain regions implicated in reward and emotion. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 98, 11818-11823.  
Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental psychology (2nd ed.). New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Brattico, E., Bogert, B., & Jacobsen, T. (2013). Toward a neural chronometry for the 
aesthetic experience of music. Frontiers in psychology, 4, 206. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00206 
Brattico, E., & Pearce, M. T. (2013). The neuroaesthetics of music. Psychology of 
Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 7, pp.  
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       33 
Brieber, D., Nadal, M., & Leder, H. (2015). In the white cube: Museum context 
enhances the valuation and memory of art. Acta Psychologica, 154, 36-42. 
doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.11.004 
Brieber, D., Nadal, M., Leder, H., & Rosenberg, R. (2014). Art in time and space: 
Context modulates the relation between art experience and viewing time. Plos 
One, 9(6): e99019. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0099019 
Brinkmann, H., Commare, L., Leder, H., & Rosenberg, R. (2014). Abstract art as a 
universal language? Leonardo, 47, 256-257.  
Brown, S., & Dissanayake, E. (2009). The arts are more than aesthetics: 
Neuroaesthetics as narrow aesthetics. In M. Skov & O. Vartanian (Eds.), 
Neuroaesthetics (pp. 43-57). Amityville, NY: Baywood. 
Brown, S., Gao, X., Tisdelle, L., Eickhoff, & Liotti, M. (2011). Naturalizing 
aesthetics: Brain areas for aesthetic appraisal across sensory modalities. 
NeuroImage, 58, 250-258.  
Burke, E. (1757). A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime 
and the Beautiful. London: Dodsley. 
Carroll, N. (2008). Aesthetic experience, art and artists. In R. Shusterman & A. 
Tomlin (Eds.), Aesthetic Experience (pp. 145-165). New York: Routledge. 
Cela-Conde, C. J., Ayala, F. J., Munar, E., Maestú, F., Nadal, M., Capó, M. A., . . . 
Marty, G. (2009). Sex-related similarities and differences in the neural 
correlates of beauty. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 
106, 3847-3852.  
Cela-Conde, C. J., García-Prieto, J., Ramasco, J. J., Mirasso, C. R., Bajo, R., Munar, 
E., . . . Maestú, F. (2013). Dynamics of brain networks in the aesthetic 
appreciation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 
110(Suppl. 2), 10454-10461.  
Chatterjee, A. (2011). Neuroaesthetics: A coming of age story. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 23, 53-62.  
Chatterjee, A. (2014a). The aesthetic brain. How we evolved to desire beauty and 
enjoy art. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Chatterjee, A. (2014b). Scientific aesthetics: Three steps forward. British Journal of 
Psychology, 105, 465-467.  
Chatterjee, A., Bromberger, B., Smith II, W. B., Sternschein, R., & Widick, P. (2011). 
Artistic production following brain damage: A study of three artists. 
Leonardo, 55, 405–410.  
Chatterjee, A., Thomas, A., Smith, S. E., & Aguirre, G. K. (2009). The neural 
response to facial attractiveness. Neuropsychology, 23, 135-143.  
Chatterjee, A., & Vartanian, O. (2014). Neuroaesthetics. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 18, 370-375.  
Child, I. L. (1962). Personal preferences as an expression of aesthetic sensitivity. 
Journal of Personality, 30, 496-512.  
Churchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1988). Perspectives on Cognitive 
Neuroscience. Science, 242, 741-745.  
Churchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1992). The computational brain. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press. 
Conway, B. R., & Rehding, A. (2013). Neuroaesthetics and the trouble with beauty. 
PLoS Biology, 11, e1001504. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.1001504 
Cross, E. S., & Ticini, L. F. (2011). Neuroaesthetics and beyond: new horizons in 
appliying the science of the brain to the art of dance. Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, In press.  
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       34 
Danto, A. C. (1997). After the end of art. Contemporary art and the pale of history. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Darwin, C. (1871/1998). The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. 
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. 
Di Dio, C., & Gallese, V. (2009). Neuroaesthetics: A review. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 19, 1-6.  
Dickie, G. (1962). Is psychology relevant to aesthetics? The Philosophical Review, 
71, 285-302.  
Dissanayake, E. (1988). What is art for? Seattle, WA: University of Washington 
Press. 
Dissanayake, E. (2009). The artification hypothesis and its relevance to cognitive 
science, evolutionary aesthetics, and neuroaesthetics. Cognitive Semiotics, 5, 
148-173.  
Egermann, H., Pearce, M. T., Wiggins, G. A., & McAdams. (2013). Probabilistic 
models of expectation violation predict psychophysiological emotional 
responses to live concert music. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioural 
Neuroscience, 13, 533-553.  
Ekman, P., & Davidson, R. J. (Eds.). (1994). The nature of emotion. Fundamental 
questions. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Fechner, G. T. (1860). Elemente der Psychophysik. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel. 
Fechner, G. T. (1876). Vorschule der Ästhetik. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel. 
Fechner, G. T. (1987). Some thoughts on the psychophysical representation of 
memories (E. Scheerer, Trans.). Psychological Research, 49, 209-212. 
(Translated from Revision der Hauptpunkte der Psychophysik, pp. 290-299, by 
G. T. Fechner, 1882, Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel).  
Frank, M. J., & Badre, D. (2015). How cognitive theory guides neuroscience. 
Cognition, 135, 14-20.  
Gazzaniga, M. S. (Ed.). (1984). Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience. New York: 
Plenum Press. 
Gopnik, B. (2012). Aesthetic science and artistic knowledge. In A. P. Shimamura & 
S. E. Palmer (Eds.), Aesthetic science. Connecting minds, brains and 
experience (pp. 129-159). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Götz, K. O., Borisy, A. R., Lynn, R., & Eysenck, H. J. (1979). A new visual aesthetic 
sensitivity test: I Construction and psychometric properties. Perceptual and 
Motor Skills, 49, 795-802.  
Huang, M., Bridge, H., Kemp, M. J., & Parker, A. J. (2011). Human cortical activity 
evoked by the assignment of authenticity when viewing works of art. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5, doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00134.  
Hupbach, A., Gomez, R., Hardt, O., & Nadel, L. (2007). Reconsolidation of episodic 
memories: a subtle reminder triggers integration of new information. Learning 
and Memory, 14, 47–53.  
Huron, D. (2006). Sweet anticipation: Music and the psychology of expectation. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hutton, N., & Kelly, L. (2013). Where lines are drawn. Science, 341, 1453-1454.  
Hyman, J. (2010). Art and neuroscience. In R. Frigg & M. C. Hunter (Eds.), Beyond 
Mimesis and Convention. Representation in Art and Science (pp. 245-261). 
New York: Springer. 
Izard, C. E. (2010). The Many Meanings/Aspects of Emotion: Definitions, Functions, 
Activation, and Regulation. Emotion Review, 2, 363-370.  
Izuma, K., & Adolphs, R. (2013). Social manipulation of preference in the human 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       35 
brain. Neuron, 78, 563-573.  
Ishizu, T., & Zeki, S. (2011). Toward a brain-based theory of beauty. Plos One, 6(7), 
e21852. doi:21810.21371/journal.pone.0021852.  
Jacobsen, T. (2006). Bridging the arts and sciences: A framework for the psychology 
of aesthetics. Leonardo, 39, 155-162.  
Jacobsen, T., & Höfel, L. (2001). Aesthetics electrified: An analysis of descriptive 
symmetry and evaluative aesthetic judgment processes using event-related 
brain potentials. Empirical Studies of the Arts, 19, 177-190.  
Jacobsen, T., & Höfel, L. (2003). Descriptive and evaluative judgment processes: 
behavioral and electrophysiological indices of processing symmetry and 
aesthetics. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 3(4), 289-299.  
James, W. (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind, 9, 188-205.  
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Henry Holt. 
Jola, C., Abedian-Amiri, A., Kuppuswamy, A., Pollick, F. E., & Grosbras, M.-H. 
(2012). Motor Simulation without Motor Expertise: Enhanced Corticospinal 
Excitability in Visually Experienced Dance Spectators. Plos One, 7, e33343. 
doi:33310.31371/journal.pone.0033343.  
Jola, C., & Grosbras, M. H. (2013). In the here and now: Enhanced motor 
corticospinal excitability in novices when watching live compared to video 
recorded dance. Cognitive Neuroscience, 4, 90-98. doi: 
10.1080/17588928.2013.776035 
Jola, C., Pollick, F. E., & Grosbras, M. H. (2011). Arousal decrease in Sleeping 
Beauty: Audiences’ neurophysiological correlates to watching a narrative 
dance performance of 2.5 hrs. Dance Research, 29, 378-403.  
Kampe, K. K., Frith, C. D., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, U. (2001). Reward value of 
attractiveness and gaze. Nature(413), 589.  
Kant, I. (1790/1892). Critique of Judgment. London: Macmillan and Co. 
Kaplan, S. (1987). Aesthetics, affect, and cognition. Environment and Behavior, 19, 
3-32.  
Killeen, P. R. (2001). The four causes of behavior. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 10, 136-140.  
Kirk, U., Skov, M., Christensen, M. S., & Nygaard, N. (2009). Brain correlates of 
aesthetic expertise: A parametric fMRI study. Brain and Cognition, 69, 306-
315.  
Kirk, U., Skov, M., Hulme, O., Christensen, M. S., & Zeki, S. (2009). Modulation of 
aesthetic value by semantic context: An fMRI study. NeuroImage, 44, 1125-
1132.  
Kozbelt, A., & Seeley, W. P. (2007). Integrating Art Historical, Psychological, and 
Neuroscientific Explanations of Artists’ Advantages in Drawing and 
Perception. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 1, 80-90.  
Lacey, S., Hagtvedt, H., Patrick, V. M., Anderson, A., Silla, R., Deshpande, G., . . . 
Sathian, K. (2011). Art for reward's sake: Visual art recruits the ventral 
striatum. NeuroImage, 55, 420-433.  
Leder, H. (2013). Next steps in neuroaesthetics. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, 
and the Arts, 7, 27-37.  
Leder, H., Belke, B., Oeberst, A., & Augustin, D. (2004). A model of aesthetic 
appreciation and aesthetic judgments. British Journal of Psychology, 95, 489-
508.  
Leder, H., & Nadal, M. (2014). Ten years of a model of aesthetic appreciation and 
aesthetic judgments: The aesthetic episode—developments and challenges in 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       36 
empirical aesthetics. British Journal of Psychology, 105, 443–464. doi: 
10.1111/bjop.12084 
Leder, H., Tinio, P. P. L., Fuchs, I. M., & Bohrn, I. (2010). When attractiveness 
demands longer looks: The effects of situation and gender. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63, 1858-1871.  
Lengger, P. G., Fischmeister, F. P. S., Leder, H., & Bauer, H. (2007). Functional 
neuroanatomy of the perception of modern art: A DC-EEG study on the 
influence of stylistic information on aesthetic experience. Brain Research, 
1158, 93-102.  
Levinson, J. (1996). The pleasures of aesthetics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Levinson, J. (2003). Philosophical aesthetics: An overview. In J. Levinson (Ed.), The 
Oxford handbook of aesthetics (pp. 3-24). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Levy, D. J., & Glimcher, P. W. (2012). The root of all value: a neural common 
currency for choice. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 22, 1027-1038.  
Locke, J. (1690/1997). An essay concerning human understanding. London: Penguin. 
Lorblanchet, M. (2007). The origin of art. Diogenes, 214, 98-109.  
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human 
Representation and Processing of Visual Information. New York: Freeman. 
Marshall, H. R. (1894). Pain, pleasure and aesthetics. An essay concerning the 
psychology of pain and pleasure with special reference to aesthetics. London: 
Macmillan and Co. 
Massey, I. (2009). The neural imagination. Aesthetic and neuroscientific approaches 
to the arts. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Mather, M., Cacioppo, J. T., & Kanwisher, N. (2013). How fMRI can inform 
cognitive theories. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 108-113.  
Mende-Siedlecki, P., Said, C., & Todorov, A. (2012). The social evaluation of faces: 
a meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies. Social Cognitive and 
Affective Neuroscience, 8, 285-299. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr090 
Minissale, G. (2012). Conceptual Art: A Blind Spot for Neuroaesthetics? Leonardo, 
45, 43–48.  
Munro, T. (1928). Scientific method in aesthetics. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Nadal, M. (2013). The experience of art: Insights from neuroimaging. Progress in 
Brain Research, 204, 135-158. 
Nadal, M., & Pearce, M. T. (2011). The Copenhagen Neuroaesthetics conference: 
Prospects and pitfalls for an emerging field. Brain and Cognition, 76, 172–
183.  
Nadal, M., & Skov, M. (2013). Introduction to the Special Issue: Toward an 
Interdisciplinary Neuroaesthetics. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and 
the Arts, 7, 1-12.  
Nalbantian, S. (2008). Neuroaesthetics: Neuroscientific theory and illustration from 
the arts. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 33, 357-368.  
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Persico, A. M., & Bourgeron, T. (2006). Searching for ways out of the autism maze: 
genetic, epigenetic and environmental clues. Trends in Neurosciences, 29(7), 
349-358. doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2006.05.010 
Plassmann, H., O'Doherty, J., Shiv, B., & Rangel, A. (2008). Marketing actions can 
modulate neural representations of experienced pleasantness. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 105(3), 1050-1054. doi: 
10.1073/pnas.0706929105 
Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data? 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       37 
Trends in Cognitive Science, 10, 59-63.  
Reid, T. (1785). Essays on the intellectual powers of man. Edinburgh: John Bell. 
Reimann, M., Zaichkowsky, J., Neuhaus, C., Bender, T., & Weber, B. (2010). 
Aesthetic package design: A behavioral, neural, and psychological 
investigation. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20, 431–441.  
Roberson, D., & Hanley, J. R. (2007). Color vision: Color categories vary with 
language after all. Current Biology, 17, R605–R607.  
Salimpoor, V. N., Benovoy, M., Larcher, K., Dagher, A., & Zatorre, R. J. (2011). 
Anatomically distinct dopamine release during anticipation and experience of 
peak emotion to music. Nature Neuroscience, 14, 257–262.  
Salimpoor, V. N., van den Bosch, I., Kovacevic, N., McIntosh, A. R., Dagher, A., & 
Zatorre, R. J. (2013). Interactions between the nucleus accumbens and 
auditory cortices predict music reward value Science, 340, 216-219.  
Salimpoor, V. N., Zald, D. H., Zatorre, R. J., Dagher, A., McIntosh, A. R. (2015). 
Predictions and the Brain: How Musical Sounds Become Pleasurable. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 19, 86-91. 
 Salimpoor, V. N., & Zatorre, R. J. (2013). Neural interactions that give rise to 
musical pleasure. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 7, 62-75.  
Santayana, G. (1896). The sense of beauty. Being the outline of aesthetic theory. New 
York: Dover Publications. 
Scheerer, E. (1987). The unknown Fechner. Psychological Research, 49, 197-202.  
Scherer, K. R. (2004). Which emotions can be induced by music? What are the 
underlying mechanisms? And how can we measure them? Journal of New 
Music Research, 33, 239–251.  
Scherer, K. R., & Zentner, M. R. (2001). Emotional effects of music: Production 
rules. In P. N. Juslin & J. A. Sloboda (Eds.), Music and emotion: theory and 
research (pp. 361-392). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Schifferstein, H. N. J. (2010). From salad to bowl: The role of sensory analysis in 
product experience research. Food Quality and Preference, 21, 1059–1067. 
doi: 10.1016/j.foodqual.2010.07.007 
Seeley, W. P. (2011). What is the cognitive neuroscience of art … and why should we 
care? . American Society for Aesthetics Newsletter, 31, 1-4.  
Seeley, W. P. (2014). Philosophy of art and empirical aesthetics: resistance and 
rapprochement. In P. P. L. Tinio & J. K. Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge 
handbook of the psychology of aesthetics and the arts (pp. 35-59). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Segev, I., Martínez, L. M., & Zatorre, R. J. (2014). Brain and art. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 8, 465. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00465 
Sescousse, G., Caldú, X., Segura, B., & Dreher, J.-C. (2013). Processing of primary 
and secondary rewards: A quantitative meta-analysis and review of human 
functional neuroimaging studies. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 
37, 681-696. 
Shaftesbury, L., (Anthony Ashley Cooper). (1711/1999). Characteristics of men, 
manners, opinions, times. In L. E. Klein (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Shelton, A. (1992). Predicates of aesthetic judgment: Ontology and value in Huichol 
material representations. In J. Coote & A. Shelton (Eds.), Anthropology, Art, 
and Aesthetics (pp. 209-244). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Shepard, R. N. (1982). Structural representations of musical pitch. In D. Deutsch 
(Ed.), Psychology of Music (pp. 343–390). New York: Academic Press. 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       38 
Shimamura, A. P., & Palmer, S. (Eds.). (2012). Aesthetic Science. Connecting minds, 
brains, and experience. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Shusterman, R. (1997). The End of Aesthetic Experience. The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism, 55, 29-41.  
Silvia, P. J. (2009). Looking Past Pleasure: Anger, Confusion, Disgust, Pride, 
Surprise, and Other Unusual Aesthetic Emotions. Psychology of Aesthetics, 
Creativity, and the Arts, 3, 48-51.  
Silvia, P. J., & Brown, E. M. (2007). Anger, disgust, and the negative aesthetic 
emotions: Expanding an appraisal model of aesthetic experience. Psychology 
of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 1, 100-106.  
Skov, M. (2010). The pleasure of art. In M. L. Kringelbach & K. C. Berridge (Eds.), 
Pleasures of the brain (pp. 270-283). Cambridge, MA: Oxford University 
Press. 
Skov, M., & Vartanian, O. (Eds.). (2009). Neuroaesthetics. Amitiville NY: Baywood. 
Snow, C. P. (1964). The two cultures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stevens, C. J., Schubert, E., Morris, R. H., Frear, M., Chen, J., Healey, S., . . . 
Hansen, S. (2009). Cognition and the temporal arts: Investigating audience 
response to dance using PDAs that record continuous data during live 
performance. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 67, 800-813. 
doi: 10.1016/j.ijhcs.2009.06.001. 
Tallis, R. (2008). The limitations of a neurological approach to art. The Lancet, 372, 
19-20.  
Tinio, P. L., & Leder, H. (2009). Natural Scenes Are Indeed Preferred, but Image 
Quality Might Have the Last Word. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and 
the Arts, 3, 52-56.  
Tolstoy, L. (1904). What is art? New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 
Tomlin, A. (2008). Introduction. Contemplating the undefinable. In R. Shusterman & 
A. Tomlin (Eds.), Aesthetic Experience (pp. 145-165). New York: Routledge. 
Tschacher, W., Greenwood, S., Kirchberg, V., Wintzerith, S., van den Berg, K., & 
Tröndle, M. (2012). Physiological correlates of aesthetic perception of 
artworks in a museum. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 6, 
96-103.  
van Buren, B., Bromberger, B., Potts, D., Miller, B., & Chatterjee, A. (2013). 
Changes in Painting Styles of Two Artists with Alzheimer’s Disease. 
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 7, pp.  
Van der Laan, L. N., De Ridder, D. T. D., Viergever, M. A., & Smeets, P. A. M. 
(2012). Appearance Matters: Neural Correlates of Food Choice and Packaging 
Aesthetics. PLoS ONE 7, 7(7), e41738. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0041738 
Vartanian, O., & Goel, V. (2004). Neuroanatomical correlates of aesthetic preference 
for paintings. NeuroReport, 15, 893-897.  
Vartanian, O., Lam, E., Fisher, M., Granic, J., & Goel, V. (2013). Middle temporal 
gyrus encodes individual differences in perceived facial attractiveness. 
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 7, pp.  
Vartanian, O., Navarrete, G., Chatterjee, A., Fich, L. B., Leder, H., Modrono, C., . . . 
Skov, M. (2013). Impact of contour on aesthetic judgments and approach-
avoidance decisions in architecture. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 110 Suppl 2, 10446-10453. doi: 
10.1073/pnas.1301227110 
Vartanian, O., & Skov, M. (2014). Neural correlates of viewing paintings: Evidence 
from a quantitative meta-analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Aesthetic Experience                                                       39 
data. Brain and Cognition, 87, 52-56. 
Vessel, E. A., Starr, G. G., & Rubin, N. (2012). The brain on art: intense aesthetic 
experience activates the default mode network. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 6, 66. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00066.  
Wang, T., Mo, L., Vartanian, O., Cant, J. S., & Cupchik, G. (2015). An investigation 
of the neural substrates of mind wandering induced by viewing traditional 
Chinese landscape paintings. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 1018. doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2014.01018 
White, C. N., & Poldrack, R. A. (2013). Using fMRI to constrain theories of 
cognition. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 79-83.  
Wilson, A., & Chatterjee, A. (2005). The assessment of preference for balance: 
Introducing a new test. Empirical Studies of the Arts, 23, 165-180.  
Winston, J. S., O’Doherty, J., Kilner, J. M., Perrett, D. I., & Dolan, R. J. (2007). Brain 
systems for assessing facial attractiveness. Neuropsychologia, 45, 195-206.  
Zaidel, D. W. (2005). Neuropsychology of Art: Neurological, Cognitive, and 
Evolutionary Perspectives. Hove, England: Psychology Press. 
Zaidel, D. W. (2010). Art and brain: Insights from neuropsychology, biology and 
evolution. Journal of Anatomy, 216, 177–183.  
Zeki, S., & Marini, L. (1998). Three cortical stages of colour processing in the human 
brain. Brain, 121, 1669-1685.  
Zeki, S., Romaya, J. P., Benincasa, D. M. T., & Atiyah, M. F. (2014). The experience 
of mathematical beauty and its neural correlates. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 8(68). doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00068 
